Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Hermarchus, Jean-Paul Sartre and Thomas Reid

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26 ideas

16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3847 Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
7109 If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
7106 The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
7117 How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
7123 Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
22225 My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
7116 When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
7124 The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
7120 It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
7110 If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
7115 Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
7121 The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3846 Man IS freedom [Sartre]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23681 The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
23676 A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23668 Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
23680 We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]