Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anaxarchus, Ian McFetridge and David Hume

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23 ideas

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3819 Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
1317 A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
1331 The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
1388 Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
21297 A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
5323 Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
1316 Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
1333 Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume]
1332 We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume]
21305 Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]
21307 Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
21306 Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
21311 Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21312 Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
21294 A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume]
21295 When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume]
21298 We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume]
21304 Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume]
21308 We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
21310 Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2222 The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
2223 Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
3655 Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]