Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Herodotus, A.J. Ayer and Peter Geach
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
10 ideas
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
|
5177
|
Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer]
|
|
5662
|
Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
|
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
|
5178
|
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
|
|
2613
|
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
|
|
5167
|
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
|
|
5328
|
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
|
|
5330
|
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
|
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
|
8775
|
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
|
|
8776
|
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
|
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
|
10732
|
If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
|