Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, John Searle and Karl Popper

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18 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds

3463	We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

3457	Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind

3480	We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]

5792	Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness

5786	A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]

5794	Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]

5795	There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness

3479	The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness

3470	Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind

3486	Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]

3503	Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality

3465	Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]

3484	Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]

3489	Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

3494	Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]

3481	Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

5788	The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

4088	Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]