Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Eubulides, F.R. Tennant and David Papineau

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13 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
7852 The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
7864 Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
7873 Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
7874 Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
7882 Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
7854 Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
7889 Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
7891 We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
7890 Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
7885 The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
7886 Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
7887 States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
7888 Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]