Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Carl Hempel and Rom Harr

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14 ideas

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
15880 In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
15869 Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
22179 Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
15881 We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
15882 Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
15887 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
15888 The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
15889 It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
15890 Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
21507 Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
6755 For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
17083 The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13052 Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
15885 The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]