Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, Charles Sanders Peirce and Baruch de Spinoza
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these philosophers
display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
12 ideas
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
|
19243
|
If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce]
|
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
|
14766
|
Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce]
|
|
19225
|
I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce]
|
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
|
19234
|
'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce]
|
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
|
19235
|
How does induction get started? [Peirce]
|
|
19236
|
Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce]
|
|
19251
|
The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
|
4312
|
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
|
13073
|
To understand the properties we must know the essence, as with a circle [Spinoza]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
|
14790
|
'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce]
|
|
14791
|
Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce]
|
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / b. Rejecting explanation
|
19222
|
Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce]
|