Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Kent Bach and Fred Dretske
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11 ideas
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
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You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
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Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
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We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
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Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
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Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
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The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
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P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
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We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
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How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach]
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If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach]
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Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach]
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