Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Immanuel Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein

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22 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant]
Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant]
The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant]
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
For each necessity in the world there is an arbitrary rule of language [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M]
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM]
An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein]
The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein]