Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Hermarchus, E Sosa / M Tooley and Kit Fine
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17 ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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9205
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The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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9209
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Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
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15064
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Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
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9200
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Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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9212
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Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
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14530
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The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
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17289
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Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K]
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11166
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The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
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9216
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Each area of enquiry, and its source, has its own distinctive type of necessity [Fine,K]
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17273
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Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
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11169
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Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
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11162
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Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
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11168
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Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
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15070
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It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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9213
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The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
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15069
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Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
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15068
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The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
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