Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Eubulides, Max Black and Robert C. Stalnaker
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18 ideas
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
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16429
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A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
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16397
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If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
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16399
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Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
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16398
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Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
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16433
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Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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14285
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A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
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15793
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We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
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16396
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Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
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16437
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Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
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16444
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Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
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16445
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I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
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12765
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Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
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16408
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Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
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16409
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Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
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16411
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If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
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16412
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If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
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16454
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Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
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16450
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Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
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