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Single Idea 7874

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds ]

Full Idea

There is debate about whether we attribute beliefs and desires to others, and predict their behaviour, by simulating the decisions we would make ourselves ('simulation-theory'), or by deducing them from some general theory ('theory-theory').

Gist of Idea

Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.7)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.115


A Reaction

Could be both. If someone is hurt, empathy leads to direct mind-reading (which seems like simulation), but if someone is behaving strangely we may have to bring theories to bear, because this person seems to be different.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [how we might know of other minds]:

We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke]
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell]
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer]
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau]
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau]
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
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