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Single Idea 23005
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
]
Full Idea
The laws of nature are time-reversal invariant, with the small exception of the kaon (a type of sub-atomic particle)
Gist of Idea
The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature
Source
Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 5.3.2)
Book Ref
Baron,S/Miller,K: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Time' [Polity 2019], p.132
A Reaction
If that fact about the kaon were very secure indeed, then that would mean the collapse of the claims about the time-invariance of the laws. Since time-invariance is still routinely asserted, I assume it is not secure.
The
36 ideas
from 'Intro to the Philosophy of Time'
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22986
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The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction
[Baron/Miller]
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22987
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The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects
[Baron/Miller]
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22989
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Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2
[Baron/Miller]
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22988
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The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series
[Baron/Miller]
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22990
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The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future
[Baron/Miller]
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22991
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How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real?
[Baron/Miller]
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22992
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If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing
[Baron/Miller]
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22994
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Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised'
[Baron/Miller]
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22993
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For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't
[Baron/Miller]
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22995
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Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time
[Baron/Miller]
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22996
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The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties
[Baron/Miller]
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22997
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The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property
[Baron/Miller]
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22998
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How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times?
[Baron/Miller]
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22999
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It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow
[Baron/Miller]
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23000
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Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level
[Baron/Miller]
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23001
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The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference
[Baron/Miller]
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23002
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In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric
[Baron/Miller]
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23003
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Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic
[Baron/Miller]
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23004
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The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else
[Baron/Miller]
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23005
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The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature
[Baron/Miller]
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23006
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Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy
[Baron/Miller]
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23007
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The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow
[Baron/Miller]
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23008
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Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things
[Baron/Miller]
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23009
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There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates
[Baron/Miller]
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23010
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We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects
[Baron/Miller]
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23011
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Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals
[Baron/Miller]
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23013
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The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge
[Baron/Miller]
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23014
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If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?)
[Baron/Miller]
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23015
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The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are
[Baron/Miller]
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23016
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Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system
[Baron/Miller]
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23017
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Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist
[Baron/Miller]
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23018
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How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time?
[Baron/Miller]
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23020
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If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist
[Baron/Miller]
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23022
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Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit
[Baron/Miller]
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23023
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How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist?
[Baron/Miller]
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23024
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A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original!
[Baron/Miller]
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