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Full Idea
There is still some hope for something like identity theory for sensations. But almost no one believes that strict identity theory will work for more complex mental states. Strict identity is stronger than type neurophysicalism.
Gist of Idea
Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be
Source
Owen Flanagan (The Really Hard Problem [2007], 3 'Ontology')
Book Ref
Flanagan,Owen: 'The Really Hard Problem' [MIT 2007], p.94
A Reaction
It is so hard to express the problem. What needs to be explained? How can one bunch of neurons represent many different things? It's not like computing. That just transfers the data to brains, where the puzzling stuff happens.
| 21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
| 21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
| 21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
| 21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
| 21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
| 21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
| 21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |