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Full Idea
I reject saying there must be an additional truthmaker for 'Determinately, p': rather, I say that the truthmaker for p must simply be a determinate existent rather than a mere existent.
Gist of Idea
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
Source
Ross P. Cameron (Truthmaking for Presentists [2011], 6)
Book Ref
'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6', ed/tr. Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K [OUP 2011], p.82
A Reaction
As he puts it (quite persuasively), God doesn't need to add an extra truthmaker for a determinate truth. Cameron rejects Necessitarianism. He uses 'determinate' fairly uncritically. What makes the truth of the truthmaker's determinacy?
Related Idea
Idea 18928 If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
| 18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
| 18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
| 7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
| 18469 | God might necessitate that something happen, but He is not the truth-maker for it [Smith,B] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
| 15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
| 18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
| 18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
| 18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |