more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Eliminativism is often associated with Unger, who defends 'mereological nihilism', that there are no composite objects (objects with proper parts); there are only mereological simples (with no proper parts). The nihilist denies statues and ships.
Gist of Idea
There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples
Source
report of Peter Unger (There are no ordinary things [1979]) by Ryan Wasserman - Material Constitution 4
Book Ref
'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.11
A Reaction
The puzzle here is that he has a very clear notion of identity for the simples, but somehow bars combinations from having identity. So identity is simplicity? 'Complex identity' doesn't sound like an oxymoron. We're stuck if there are no simples.
| 11209 | The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
| 23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
| 17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
| 16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 6125 | We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks] |
| 22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |