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Full Idea
Possible worlds are just not the sorts of things that could ground modality; they are not suitable truthmakers.
Gist of Idea
Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality
Source
Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §3)
Book Ref
-: 'Philosophical Studies' [-], p.6
A Reaction
Are possible world theorists actually claiming that the worlds 'ground' modality? Maybe Lewis is, since all those concrete worlds had better do some hard work, but for the ersatzist they just provide a kind of formal semantics, leaving ontology to others.
| 12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
| 14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
| 14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
| 12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
| 12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
| 12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
| 14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
| 12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
| 14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
| 14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
| 14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
| 12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
| 14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |